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Abstract 
In the modern globalized economy there are some concepts which are very important for 
the current socio-economic system. One of them is competition. A specific field that 
competition has spread is geography; i.e. competition among territorial units (cities, 
regions or states). There are scholars who defend it and scholars who criticize it. This 
paper focuses on the overview of these opinions and on the weak issues of territorial 
competition which show its incoherence. Within this context, and through a broader study 
over the behaviour of a firm and a territory, the cases of Greece and Dubai present 
remarkable interest regarding their behaviour under bad economic performance and its 
comparison with the behaviour of a firm, particularly in case of default. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is now broadly accepted that space is not flat and neutral and has different 
characteristics; in such a way space contributes to different levels of development and to 
different speed of growth (Krugman, 1998) for each territorial unit. So, space creates, 
both negative and positive, social situations (Harvey, 2001). As each economic and social 
phenomenon reflects in space, so is competition related with space. 
Many opinions have been expressed for territorial competition, a phenomenon which 
takes place among territorial units (states, regions or cities) in order to have the highest 
profits (developing, economic, social) for the ‘winner’ territorial unit. There are scholars 
who defend that competition does not concern only firms but also territories (Camagni, 
1991; Cheshire & Gordon, 1996; Porter, 1999; Shotar, 2005; Metaxas & Tsavdaridou, 
2011) and there are others who dispute it (Krugman, 1996; McFetridge, 1995; Yap, 
2004). The first issue that this paper deals with is a general review of these opinions 
regarding territorial competition, going through a comparison between the economic 
behavior of a firm and a territory, making efforts to show the concept’s incoherence and 
importance.  
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The discussion over territorial competition includes many comparisons of the 
economic behaviour between a firm and a territory. One of these aspects is analyzed in 
the second part of this paper which focuses on the comparison between the way that a 
firm and a territorial unit behave in occasion of bad economic performance, the 
possibility of defaulting and what this default finally means. In this way of thinking, this 
paper studies Greece and Dubai, two cases which had recently (and still have) extremely 
bad economic performance, aiming at proving that the way that a territorial unit behaves 
in such an occasion is quite different to this of a firm. 
This paper aims, in this way, at participating in the scientific debate regarding 
territorial competition which includes many interesting opinions of economists, planners 
and geographers. Summarizing, this paper contributes to this debate with: a) a deep 
review of the theoretical review for territorial competition in order to propose a 
classification of all the opinions in two approaches: defenders and critical, b) as an 
outcome of this review, there efforts to show territorial competition’s incoherence by 
focusing on its weak issues, c) a comparison between the behaviour of a firm and of a 
territory in case of bad economic performance or bankruptcy. 
 With these questions, this paper makes efforts to challenge many misconceptions 
regarding territorial competition. An integrated review can contribute to a better 
understanding of the notion of territorial competition. Finally, by the case studies it is 
shown if a national state can extinct after its default or not. 
  
2. The opinions for territorial competition  
     According to Porter (1999), the theory that competition is one of the most powerful 
forces for making things better is truer nowadays than it had never been before, because 
competition appears in almost every aspect of our life, including education, health, arts, 
wealth fare, politics and others. One of these fields is geography resulting in the 
emergence of territorial competition. 
To start with this study, it is necessary to define the perception and the meaning of the 
concept of “territory” and the way that it is used in this paper. Territories are social 
aggregation, spatially expressed, each of them with its own economic and political 
characteristics (Lovering, 1999). In other words, it is considered that territories are 
economic entities, collective bodies which link the economic conditions to a place. 
Territorial competition was introduced in policy and science discussion in the period 
of globalization, which is characterized by the increasing complexity and density of 
global supply chains, internationalization of finance, market and commerce by opening 
national borders and, mainly, high accumulation of wealth in large multinational 
corporations and elites who benefit from them (Harvey, 2005; Aiginger, 2006; Pitelis, 
1996). These important changes have been implemented by policies which support and 
are promoted by neoliberalism.  
 
Defenders 
 Throughout evolution of economic geography, mainly during last 20 years, a 
particular approach, defended by many authors, has established the concept of territorial 
competition, meaning competition among territories (states, regions, cities). According to 
Lever and Turok (1999) it is the effort of the regions or states to “produce goods and 
services which meet the test of the wider regional, national and international markets, 
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while simultaneously increasing real incomes, improving the quality of life for citizens 
and promoting development in a way which is sustainable”.  
In terms of governance territorial competition is: 
“The process through which groups, acting on behalf of territorial economy, seek to 
promote it as a location for economic activities, either implicitly or explicitly, in 
competition with other places.”(Cheshire & Gordon, 1996) 
 According to Reinert (1995), a territory competes in order to create the conditions for 
a rise of its standards of living. A territory is competitive when it is capable to attract and 
keep economic activities while the standards of living maintain stable or increasing 
(Storper, 1997). Also, through territorial competition the economy of a territory (mainly 
one of the winners) can provide an increasing standard of life for its inhabitants (Malecki, 
2000).  
 It is not only the marketing or the attempts for selling the territories, but also the 
improvement of the factors that makes the territory attractive for investment and 
migration (Malecki, 2004), in the struggle of territorial competition. 
 Porter introduced the concept in a new era, “new territorial competition” in 1990 by 
focusing on competition which takes place among nations and states. Porter claimed that 
the regions compete for providing the best possible working conditions for business. 
Additionally, he emphasizes the role of clusters (which represent a combination of 
competition and co-operation) and their positive influence to the competitive advantage 
of the places (2000). Porter relates the advantage of one state on competition to four, well 
known as the ‘National Diamond’ (Figure 1).    
Figure 1: The ‘National Diamond’ 
 
Source: Porter, 1990 
 
 Gradually we move from the concept of competitiveness to that of attractiveness, 
especially when we analyze sub-national territories (region, counties, urban centers etc). 
The attractiveness refers to the double capacity to (i) attract and maintain population 
offering it appropriate standards of living and (ii) to attract and generate competitive 
activities. According to Morvan (2005: 52), this is the result of an efficient combination 
between the strategies and trajectories of the local actors and the ability of the territory to 
define a specific offer which differentiates it from other regions. Comparatively to the 
territorial competitiveness, the attractiveness refers to a more global strategy which has 
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for objective, not only the economic sustainability but also the environmental and socio-
cultural sustainability, based on the principle of “territorial capital” (Lollier et al., 2005: 
116).   
      Territorial competition has been largely promoted by institutions and organizations 
like EU (European Union) and OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development). EU has established commissions and councils which analyze, examine, 
present and propose principles and policies related to territorial units’ competition. EU 
gives to territorial competitiveness (one of the Lisbon Treaty goals) the following 
definition: “the degree to which a country can, under free and fair market conditions, 
produce goods and services which meet the test of international markets, while 
simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of its people over the long 
term” (Commission, 1999:75).  
     OECD (1996) defined competitiveness (in a general level) as ‘the capacity of firms, 
regions, places to produce high level of income and employment’. 
     It is broadly accepted that competition is a zero-sum game; it has winners and losers: 
the most powerful players win and the many weak players lose (Marx, 1844). Especially, 
Cheshire and Gordon (1998) mention that the success of one territory, which depends 
partly on the policies that are designed to promote territorial economic activity, can only 
be a fact at the expense of others. Cheshire (1999) claimed that the territories with the 
highest capacity ‘to have incentive to develop territorially competitive efforts would be 
the potential gainers’. So, the most competitive territory wins. 
      The basic question and discussion within defenders’ approach is whether the 
territories compete in the same way that the firms do and whether territories could be 
considered as products. Within this approach there seems to be conflicting views: Van 
den Berg and Braum (1999) consider that territories compete in the same way with the 
firms while Turok (2004) claims that the way is different. Territorial competition occurs 
from the competition between firms due to the ‘quality’ (the ability to achieve and 
maintain the quality of products) and ‘innovative’ (the ability to innovate) dimension: 
these two dimensions of competition meet conditions which are external to a firm (Porter, 
1999). This fact, leads to the transition from the situation that the territories are the 
locations for ‘competitive activity’ by firms in a situation that the territories must be 
‘themselves competitive’ (Courchene, 1999). 
 
Critical approach 
In the fields of economic geography, competition has been implemented into three 
different levels: 1.the firm 2.the industry 3.the nation (territory). First of all, the critical 
approach claims that firm’s competition is the most meaningful level (McFetridge, 1995). 
A direct extension of competition from firms’ to national level is a priori faulty (Yap, 
2004).  
 Territorial competition is a meaningless and useless concept and a result - derivative 
of firms’ one (Krugman, 1996). According to Krugman (1997), “competitiveness is a 
kind of ineffable essence that cannot be either defined or measured”. So, it is a case of 
firms’ competition about the location; the concept of competition “has a clear meaning 
only when applied to commensurable units (firms) engaged in commensurable activities 
(competing in a market) so that relative performance can, in principle, be measured along 
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a common scale. When applied to territorially-defined social aggregations such as cities 
or regions, the term losses all coherence” (Lovering, 2001). 
  There are many reasons that territorial competition is a misleading concept:  Firstly, urban, regional and national environment is very important for firm competition 
but not the determinant (Krugman, 1997): the determinant factors of firms’ success are 
internal to them (cost efficiency, innovation and marketing).  Secondly, the distribution of economic activities in space occurs as a physical result of 
market under agglomeration economies’ conditions.  Thirdly, the territorial units do not behave in the same way with firms in case of default 
(Krugman, 1997: 6). This issue is examined in the second part of this paper.   Growth is a concept at which a territory aims for its own sake and not in order to 
compete with the others (particularly for a state): “Maintaining productivity growth and 
technological progress is extremely important; but it is important for its own sake, not 
because it is necessary to keep up with international competition” (Krugman, 1997: 101). 
Thus, the factors of standard of living depend, mainly, on domestic market and policies 
that are implemented (Krugman 1994; Yap 2004).  
Furthermore territorial competition is a buzz concept, i.e. it is used widely but vaguely, 
without its real meaning and outside from its theoretical and technical context (Fagerberg, 
1996). Bristow (2005) claims that defenders have very simply assumed that what applies 
to the level of firms (like competition) can be transferred to other entities like territories 
and that this is not only a belief or opinion of them but the concrete reality. 
 
Table 1: Basic Characteristics of the two approaches 
Topic Defenders Critical 
Determinant factors of 
firms’ economic 
performance 
External to firm  
(Porter, 1999) 
Internal to firm 
(Krugman, 1996; 
Bristow, 2005) 
Territories bankrupt in 
the same way as firms 
Yes (Camagni, 2002) No (Krugman, 1994) 
Territories compete in the 
same way like firms do 
Yes (Van den Berg, Braum, 
1999) + No (Turok, 2004) 
No (Krugman, 1997) 
Direct extension of 
competition from firm to 
territories 
Right (Courchene, 1999) False (Lovering, 2001; 
Jessop, 2008) 
Territorial competition  
a buzz and fuzzy concept 
No (Cheshire and Gordon, 
1996) 
Yes (Fagerberg, 1996) 
A territory increase its 
growth and productivity 
for   
Competing the others (Lever 
and Turok, 1999) 
Its own sake (Krugman, 
1997) 
Territorial competition Meaningful and useful, the basis 
for territorial development 
(Storper, 1997) 
Useless and 
meaningless 
(McFetridge, 1995) 
Source: Authors 
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 According to Jessop (2008), territorial competition is a “key discursive construct” to 
which, recently, much rhetoric has been given serving particular interests which reinforce 
capitalist relations and hurt regional resilience.  It is constructed narrowly and is much 
more that the “simple head-to-head stereotype and market motivations manifested in 
multiple ways” (Bristow, 2005). Bristow, also, claims that the acceptance of territorial 
competition in the policy have taken place without dealing with many important 
questions and topics regarding it. As a consequence of defenders’ approach there has 
been spread a narrow unsophisticated and “de-contextualized” meaning of territorial 
competition which could be called as ‘placeless’ (Bristow, 2010). 
Territorial competition is a narrow concept that portrays regions as being locked in 
fierce head-to-head battles with one another for mobile capital and resources (Kitson et 
al., 2004). Thus, what is the meaning of a war between territories? According to 
Krugman (1996) it has no meaning and no usefulness. Table 1 summarizes the basic 
characteristics of the three approaches 
 
3. Weak issues of territorial competition 
 
     So, firstly, there seems to be problems regarding the definition of territorial 
competition: there has not yet been a clear definition that will be generally accepted 
(Malecki, 2002; Bristow, 2005). Furthermore, there are many problems with regards to 
measurement and indicators of territorial competition. A broadly accepted indicator has 
not been found yet (Begg, 1999). 
     The defending approach claims that the growth rate of living standards essentially 
equals the growth rate of productivity relatively to competitors and not the domestic 
productivity (Krugman, 1994). Even though world trade is larger than ever before, living 
standards are always determined by domestic factors and not by the competition for world 
markets. Growth is a concept at which a territory aims for its own sake and not in order to 
compete with the others (Krugman, 1997). 
      Territorial (national, regional or urban) environment and space are very important 
factors for economic activity location and success, but they are not the determinant ones. 
The determinant factors of firms’ performance are within firms’ environment (Krugman, 
1997). Especially regarding Multinational Enterprises, the determinant factors that drive 
the re-investment process in regions are internal in them (Phelps et al., 2003). But even 
non-multinational firms are, also, greatly affected by international networks in which they 
participate (Tracey & Clark, 2003).  
Through this study of territorial competition many differences between the economic 
behaviour of a firm and the economic behaviour of a territorial unit have been noticed. 
One of them is that that territories cannot default in the same way as the firms do. 
Camagni (2002) claimed that territories, and mainly regions, can go out of business “if all 
of its sectors are less competitive and efficient than other regions”. However, territorial 
units cannot bankrupt like firms, cannot extinct (Krugman, 1994). For a territory, 
bankruptcy does not result in extinction but is equal to the loss of its sovereignty. 
 So, concerning all the weak issues of territorial competition that were quoted above 
and with kind respect to all the opinions we could argue that territorial competition is not 
a very meaningful and coherent concept.  It has been given a disproportionately big 
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significance in terms of policy and its usefulness should be controlled. Table 2 
summarizes the main weaknesses of territorial competition 
 
Table 2: Weak issues of territorial competition 
1.No clear definition and measurement way generally 
accepted  buzz and fuzzy concept (Bristow, 2005) 
2.Living standards are always determined by internal 
factors (Krugman, 1994) 
3.Determinant factors for the firms’ performance  
internal to firms (Krugman, 1996) 
4.Territories cannot go out of business like firms do 
(Krugman, 1994) 
Source: Authors 
 
4. Do national states behave in the same way as firms in occasion of bad economic 
performance?  
The discussion over territorial competition includes many comparisons of the 
economic behaviour between a firm and a territory. One of these points is the way that a 
firm and a territorial unit behave in occasion of bad economic performance, the 
possibility of going out of business and what this finally means. So, another aspect that 
enhances the incoherence of territorial competition, being one of its weak issues, is the 
way that a territory behaves in case of bankruptcy. Below, two case studies are examined 
which show that national states may default and as a result lose their sovereignty but they 
cannot extinct from the world map, as probably firms would do (Krugman, 1994).   
 The situation, that almost all states have a quite bad economic performance, takes 
place due to the neoliberal policies that have been implemented during the last 40 years 
and mainly nowadays due to economic crisis. Currently, one of the most noticeable 
implications of crisis was its impact on the national economies and specifically on 
national debt. National debt has gradually increased by the huge amounts spent by 
governments to rescue the banks and the financial companies that have heavily invested 
in ‘toxic’ financial products in the virtual financial economy. The huge sovereign debts 
and budget deficits emerged as a result of the neoliberal policies that are based on two 
pillars: 
a) National States borrow huge loans from international markets in order to: finance 
banks and projects that are profitable for large enterprises (and not to sustain the welfare 
state as it is mainly said) and to refinance older state debt (Lapavitsas, 2010). 
b) National States don’t tax all the citizens equally and in most of times they do not tax 
the upper class (Byrne, 2001).  They do not apply progressive taxation, thus they do not 
have revenues in order to decline the debts resulting in a great increase of their deficits. 
 This situation was the main reason for the establishment of organizations like IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) which lend money to states with the exchange of 
supervising their economy (Cleaver, 1989). In current socioeconomic system the debt can 
show how bad the performance of a national economy is; it is, also, a mechanism for new 
and harder measures which on the one hand deteriorate the living standards of the 
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workers and youths and on the other hand they contribute to the reproduction of the 
system (Moran, 1998). 
Current economic crisis has largely contributed to the increase of national debts and 
deficits (Radice, 2011) especially in the developing economies (Bose and Jha, 2012). This 
crisis, originated from the housing sector, has spread to all sectors of production and 
affected mainly the developed economies of the West World (USA and EU). It has the 
characteristics of a crisis of capital hyper - accumulation (Mandel, 1985), adopted in the 
financial sector, in which global economy is extremely specialized. All these investments 
in subprime mortgages (Neira, 2009), the huge private loans and the housing sector 
bubble in the USA in 2006 are the rest of the main characteristics of this crisis 
(Lapavitsas, 2010).  
Crisis has had a huge negative impact on all the aspects of socioeconomic life in the 
West World in a geographically and socially unequal way. It is a strong, long and deep 
crisis and shows high resistance against all the attempts to confront it. Some key data 
reflect clearly the new situation: (i) in 2008, the total world growth was negative (-4.5%), 
(ii) the world real GDP growth was -0.9% in 2009 while in OECD countries the situation 
is worse : -3.3% in 2009, 0.5% in 2008 and 2.8% in 2007, (iii) consequently, in OECD 
countries, the total unemployment is increasing: 6% in 2008, 8.1% in 2009 and 8.5% in 
2010 and finally (iv) the world trade growth is negative in 2009: -11% (OECD, 2010). 
 
5. Case studies 
 
There are many examples of states (mainly in the struck of each of the three big 
global crises in the last 100 years (1929, 1971, 2008) that had a very bad performance 
which resulted in bankruptcy (Egypt 1984-6, South Africa 1993, USA 1933 and 1971, 
Japan 1952) [El-Mahdy & Torayeh, 2009]. In current period there are two very 
characteristic cases of states in a situation like this: Greece and Dubai. At this point, it 
should be noticed that in the case studies this study focuses on the territorial level of the 
national state (as an economic entity). Furthermore, there is a difference between national 
and sub-national bad economic performance and bankruptcy, i.e. that a national state’s 
default is much different to a region’s default mainly because of the different institutional 
conditions in each level. They were selected for this research for specific reasons: a) 
These two states are two of the most recent cases, when this research is conducted, which 
defaulted formally or informally, b) Greece was selected because it is the first Member 
State (MS) of EU that joined the stability program which both EU and IMF established, 
c) Dubai was selected because until 2008, that its bail out was announced, it was the 
paradigm of the fast and easy economic development. 
 
The case of Greece 
Since 2001 Greece is in Eurozone, a zone which has massive structural problems of 
institutional design and inability to cover failures. The integration of peripheral 
economies (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland) in a common currency union had its big 
disadvantages which were largely indicated during crisis: Eurozone, from its structure, 
creates surpluses for the core economies and deficits for the peripheral ones (Lapavitsas, 
2010). These surpluses become exports of capital in foreign direct investment or in bank 
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lending to the peripheral (MS). This domination of the core economies is fundamental to 
Eurozone from the extremely high exchange rates that peripheral MS accessed Eurozone. 
Greece is one of these states that had borrowed huge loans for all the reasons that 
have explained above. But, in the last decade, the situation has largely worsened: on the 
one hand Greece (like the majority of developed states) did not borrow in order to make 
investments but in order to refinance the old debt and the interests and to finance large 
enterprises (like Siemens) and on the other hand there was tax evasion of the upper class. 
In such a way, the revenues of the state were not increasing resulting in the high increase 
of deficit. 
Because of this situation, Greek government joined the EU, ECB and IMF stability 
program resulting in huge budget cuts in public expenditures and in wages in public 
sector. All these political actions took place in the name of competitiveness: Greece had 
lost its national competitiveness, so there is need to push down the minimum wage in 
order to be more competitive, but this can never happen if Germany continues to have 
stable its wages. 
The rate of deficit of Greek economy in 2000-2003 is one of the highest in EU 
(Eurostat, 2010). 2004 was the Olympic Games year which had important impact on 
Greek economy’s structure: this mega-event was stigmatized as the basis for the 
beginning of a new period of economic growth. However, it had never had the results and 
benefits that were expected on Greek economy. On contrary, the deficit increased the year 
that all the financial obligations of Greek economy took place due to the Olympic 
projects: in 2004, the rate of deficit, according to Eurostat, was the highest in EU (-7.5%). 
After 20044 Greek rate of deficit slightly decreased before being the highest in EU in 
2008 and 2009, a situation which indicates the huge negative impact that global economic 
crisis had on Greek economy revealing the previous bad performance in the most 
emphatic way. In 2009 the deficit was -15.4% of total GDP of Greek economy. Even in 
absolute numbers the Greek deficit was extremely high, being the 6th place in EU27 lower 
only than the 5 big-size economies of the Union (Germany, France, Spain, Italy, UK) and 
higher than bigger economies like the Netherlands. This is very important since Greek 
economy is a medium-size one. 
As it concerns Greek Government debt (Figure 2), from 2000 to 2006 it had wild 
fluctuations around 100% of GDP. After crisis struck Eurozone (2008), Greek debt 
gradually increased, while in 2010 it rocketed up to 144% of National GDP. Greek debt 
increased so much due to the huge loans of Greece (from both international markets and 
EU MS) in order to rescue the banks, the financial institutions and to pay off the old debt 
and interests. 
                                                             
4
 The source of all the data in this paragraph is Eurostat (2010) 
Applied Econometrics and International Development                                             Vol. 13-2 (2013) 
 
66 
Figure 2: Greek General Government Debt (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010 
 
Global economic crisis had a very negative effect in Greece, like in the whole 
periphery of EU, increasing the level of interest rates in the ‘markets’ in 6% (March 
2010) since they did not trust Greece as a guarantor. In addition, unemployment reached 
7.7% (2008) and 9.5% (2009) (ELSTAT). Then, the government preferred, among others, 
the solution of IMF and EU because the fames of possible default increased. The first 
loan after the access in the stability program of EU, ECB and IMF was almost 150 billion 
euro, in its first phase in 2010. The exchange was that the political and economic process 
of Greece would be supervised by EU, ECB and IMF. The living standards of Greek 
workers and youths at this period (labor conditions, budget cuts, austerity measures) 
largely deteriorated by the interventions of IMF and EU in the political and economic 
affairs of Greece, in the same way as in all the states that IMF interfered (Moran, 1998). 
Unemployment in Greece in 2010 rocketed up in 14.8% and in 2011 in 21% (ELSTAT, 
2012). The big majority of the loans were given in order to rescue the banking system and 
to re-finance the old debt and interests.  
Furthermore in February 2012, the voluntary hair cut of Greek debt was completed 
ending in a cut of 100 billion euro. This hair cut which was decided in 26th October 2011 
by European Commission; however, it was not the only important decision: it was 
accompanied by a new loan of 100 billion euro from EU, European Central Bank and 
IMF to Greece and 30 billion financial guarantee for the participation of private sector 
(PSI) in order to participate to the voluntary haircut (Council of EU, 2011). The hair cut 
took place through the exchange of the bonds that were expiring in 2012-2015 period 
with new that expire after 15-30 years resulting in a situation of ‘selective default’ as the 
credit rating agencies claimed.  
So, Greek government had selected to cut its internal payments (salaries, pensions) 
and to borrow huge loans in order to pay off the old debt and to rescue the banking 
system. As an exchange, huge austerity was implemented, which led Greece to the 
biggest recession in its history. At this point it should be noticed another negative aspect 
of Greece’s access to Eurozone: the inability of Greek government to have a national 
currency and financial policy since it has not its own national currency. By devaluating 
national currency and using other macroeconomic instruments without external control 
Greece would have avoided all this process and would have recovered its stability. Many 
scholars have given different names to the Greek situation: ‘selective default’, ‘domestic 
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bailout’ or that Greece was (and is still) very close to announce its bankruptcy.  The 
situation of Greece is considered as an “informal default”. As a result Greek government 
decided to lose its national sovereignty and to join the stability program of IMF and EU. 
However it did not extinct. 
After this informal default, Greece did not behave like a firm: it did not disappear or 
extinct from the world map, because Greece is not a firm but a territorial unit representing 
much more aspects than a firm. A firm which cannot cover the financial obligations of the 
business due to the lack of capital, even after many loans and government subsidies, 
(Boardman et al., 1981) bankrupts resulting in one of the following scenarios: merge with 
another firm, sale to another owner in a public auction and change of many aspects or 
totally extinct (Helwege, 2010). 
 
The case of Dubai 
Dubai, one of the seven of United Arabic Emirates, has been one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world; its economic basis is mainly on oil and real estate. 
Dubai has been in the centerpiece of the global economic crisis in 2008 because it was 
exposed to the real estate sector. As a result crisis, originating from the housing sector 
bubble, had a major negative impact on the economy of Dubai. In addition, the big 
specialization of Dubai’s economy in financial sector contributed to a more significant 
impact.  In order to be resilient in this situation, the government of Dubai increased its 
loans; as a result Dubai’s foreign debt became $88 billion in 2008 (Economist, 2009). In 
29 November 2008 it announced that it would delay repayment of its debt. The bond 
credit rating agencies announced its default. The data5 regarding this emirate indicate that 
after 2007 and especially in the beginning of the crisis it had very bad economic 
performance (Figure 3). 
  
Figure 3: UAE General Government Gross debt (% of GDP) 
                          
             Source: Ministry of Finance of UAE (2009) 
 
                                                             
5
 Great difficulties were faced in order to collect all the data for Dubai since it is not a separate 
state but it is in an intermediate situation being a member of the state of United Arabic Emirates (it 
is one emirate of this state): All the available data referred to the level of UAE. 
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Furthermore, the real annual GDP growth in UAE (Figure 4) had a gradual decline 
from 2005 until 2008 (from 8% to 4.5%) when it decreased by 5.5% in only one year 
(from 4.5% to -1% in 2009). The decline in economic growth of Dubai, which influences 
so much UAE, was a result of global economic crisis (Economist, 2009). This entire 
situation forced Dubai to announce its delay to foreign debt’s repayments. In order to 
continue its repayments and since Dubai could not borrow from the markets, the solution 
was given by a loan which Dubai borrowed from Abu Dhabi Prince. 
 
Figure 4: Real annual GDP growth (%) in United Arabic Emirates 
 
 
     Source: DSC, 2010 
 
     Despite this very bad economic performance, the decline of all important economic 
sectors and consequently Dubai’s bankruptcy, this emirate-state did not extinct (like a 
firm would have probably done) but is still active. 
     So, comparing the two cases, Greece, a national state, had a very bad economic 
performance, after crisis struck, because of its access in Eurozone, its tax evasion and its 
useless (for the majority of the society) borrowing in the past while Dubai, after crisis 
struck, had largely negative growth due to its specialization in real estate and financial 
sectors. Greece was obliged to join the rescue program of EU, ECB and IMF and to 
borrow from the MS of EU, to hair-cut its debt and to implement huge austerity which 
resulted in the biggest recession in Greece’s history during an informal default while 
Dubai’s government announced the delay to the repayment of its debt, announced its 
bankruptcy and borrowed from the prince of Abu-Dhabi. The similarity is that, despite 
their (formal or informal) default, these two states did not extinct from the world map but 
they continued to be active as territories. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
    In the first part of this paper the concept of territorial competition, the procedure which 
takes place among territories for attracting investments, residents and events, has been in 
detail examined and analyzed. There was a review in the literature through two particular 
approaches: the defenders and the critical. 
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In order to go further with the comparison of the economic behavior of a firm and of a 
territory there were efforts to show the way that a territorial unit behaves in case of bad 
economic performance or even after its default and its comparison with a firm’s behavior. 
The data of Greece and Dubai indicated their bad economic performance which 
obliged their governments to announce or almost to announce their default resulting in the 
loss of their national sovereignty (economic and political) resorting to solutions like IMF. 
But in this procedure there is a great difference between the legal entity of a firm and the 
collective body of a territorial unit. 
A territorial unit may have bad performance like a firm. A territorial unit may 
announce its default like a firm. As a result a territorial unit may lose its sovereignty like 
a firm would lose its independence if it was sold. However, a territorial unit cannot 
extinct or disappear like a firm. Many territorial units disappeared by an institutional 
change or by merging with another (after wars or change in the local-regional 
administrative system) but no of them extinct due to bankruptcy. Going further on this, 
Germany (1939, 1948), UK (1932) and India (1972) had bankrupted but they did not 
extinct. So, a firm is possible to bankrupt and to extinct whereas a territorial unit, which 
represents much more aspects than a firm, cannot extinct even after the announcement of 
its default. Bankruptcy for a national state results in the loss of sovereignty. This case 
studies’ examination contributed in extending the comparison between the behaviour of a 
firm and of a territory in the case of bad economic performance or bankruptcy.  
 Taking into account all the weak issues of territorial competition that were quoted in 
the first art of the paper and combining them with the conclusion that territories behave in 
a different way than the firms we could argue, with kind respect to all the opinions, that 
territorial competition is not a very meaningful and coherent concept.  It has been given a 
disproportionately big significance in terms of policy and its usefulness should be 
controlled.  
 However, the research regarding territorial competition and its theoretical perspective 
has more things to contribute. Some future research issues could be the direct 
examination of its real existence or the reasons to avoid territorial competition as the 
main territorial development policy. 
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